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One of the most important challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa is the deracialisation of 
its labour relations. For more than four decades, official laws and customary White behaviour 
prevented Africans from having the same access as Whites to employment opportunities, skilled 
occupations, and fair remunerations, to the detriment of economic efficiency and social equity. 
Today, making the South African economic system more competitive and more equitable under 
globalisation, requires the elimination of all racial segmentation in the labour market, one of its 
main features being wage inequalities. Achieving this goal will take time and involves several 
players notably, the government, the employers and the workers.  
The aim of this working paper is to shed light on the role of South African trade unions in the 
reduction of wage inequalities and discrimination between White and African workers. A 
preliminary step is to analyse the union wage effect among these two population groups. An 
econometric study, based on a 1997 microeconomic data set, estimates the African and White 
union earnings premium.  
The results are consistent with previous studies: only African workers get a wage benefit from 
their unionisation. This first observation already indicates that unions could influence racial wage 
differences. The African-White earnings gap is decomposed using the residual difference method 
(Oaxaca, 1973). The first interest of this specification is to take into account the endogeneity of 
the union status. Thus, the racial earnings gap depends not only on the union influence on the 
African and White wages but also on the explaining factors of the differences in the unionisation 
rates between the two population groups. Secondly, it allows one to measure the extent of racial 
inequalities (and more precisely discrimination) in union membership as well as in earnings in the 
unionised and non-unionised sectors. The main result of this study is that non-unionised African 
workers suffer from a higher earnings inequality (and discrimination) than unionised Africans.  
The next section reviews the history of discrimination and trade unions in South Africa, and 
discusses some statistical evidence describing the differences between the African and the White 
workers, regarding their average wage levels, their earnings distributions and their involvement in 
the trade union movement. Section 3 presents some estimates of the African and White union 
earnings premium. Section 4 analyses the influence unions might have on racial wage inequalities 
and discrimination.  
2. South African trade unions and racial discrimination: The historical  
    and statistical background 
2.1 Discrimination in the labour market: From legal to statistical discrimination 
A particular feature of discrimination in the South African labour market has been, for a long time, 
its legalisation by the government. A set of laws and tacit agreements has influenced the 
functioning of the labour market by establishing a racial wage and job organisation1. Some 
important discriminatory steps were undertaken either before or during the apartheid regime. At 
first, in 1924, access to official collective bargaining was refused to African workers. Then, at the 
end of the 1940s, a policy of influx control limited the geographical mobility of African workers 
and thus the competition for Whites from workers accepting jobs with lower wages and working 
                                                 
1 For further details see Griffiths and Jones (1980). 
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conditions. Another measure was the introduction, in 1956, of a system of job reservations, the 
aim of which was to allow an occupation to be legally reserved for a particular racial group.  
For several decades, this legislation created a favourable environment for employers and White 
workers to discriminate against Africans, by limiting their access to the same wages and jobs as 
Whites. However, several factors progressively revealed to the government the economic and 
social misdeeds imposed by the apartheid policy. The rise in union demands certainly favoured 
this awareness. The labour market began to become very skill-deficient as a consequence of both 
the exclusion of Africans from a performing education system and the reservation of job training 
opportunities for White workers. Moreover, the impediments to geographical and professional 
mobility hindered the efficient allocation of labour between the different activities and job 
categories. It also became difficult for the government to justify the continuation of its policy 
amidst social unrest, especially the Soweto riots in 1976 and the mushrooming industrial strikes.  
The international condemnation of the regime, through limiting foreign investment in the 
country, also contributed to the change that P.W. Botha’s policy implemented at the end of the 
1970s. Two commissions, the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions, were appointed to work 
respectively on the areas of industrial relations and legislation for urban Africans and submitted 
their reports to the government in 1979. Following their recommendations, the government 
progressively liberalised racial policy by giving African unions, in 1979, the right to participate in 
collective bargaining and removing, in the course of the 1980s, the systems of influx control and 
job reservation. So, most of the openly discriminatory laws disappeared at the end of the 1980s, 
in favour of greater freedom in labour relations. However, nothing allows one to conclude that 
discrimination, deeply implanted in labour relations, has been totally removed with the 
progressive legislation. 
Hence, several studies (Knight and McGrath (1987), Moll (1992, 1995), Hinks (1999), and 
Rospabe (2000)) were devoted to the estimation of wage discrimination between South African 
workers of different races. Using the method of the residual difference, they reach the conclusion 
that wage discrimination decreased over the period 1970 to 1990, despite a few differences in 
the figures mainly due to heterogeneous sampling. But their findings also show that there is still a 
large percentage of the wage gap that remains unexplained.  
In the early 1990s, the persistence of racial wage discrimination was a result of not only labour 
legislation but also other factors. Of course, the legacy of the apartheid policy must not be 
neglected. The discrimination prior to the labour market, in the acquisition of human capital, 
seems to greatly influence wage discrimination too. But most of all, the origin of wage 
discrimination can be explained, in the South African case, in light of statistical discrimination 
theories (Azam and Rospabe, 1999). Indeed, these theories are able to rationalise unequal wages 
paid to equally productive workers when the employer faces a situation of imperfect information 
on the workers’ characteristics and is then confronted with a problem of adverse selection.  
2.2 A short history of trade unions 
Since 1924, the official system of collective bargaining has mainly relied on the action of 
Industrial Councils2 grouping one or several trade unions and employers, registered under the 
law. Until 1979, every union representing pass-bearing employers have been excluded from 
registration and hence from the statutory system. For several decades, using their voter power, 
White workers have contributed to the adoption of discriminatory labour legislation. And as only 
White unions were free to negotiate, they were in a strong position to protect the wage interests 
of their members and thus reinforced discrimination against African workers. However, in 1930, 
an amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act stipulated that each Industrial Council agreement 
                                                 
2 Renamed Bargain ing Councils in the new Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
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could be extended, after a Labour Minister decision, to all workers in the industry, whether or not 
they belonged to a trade union participating in the negotiation.  
In 1925, the Wage Act allowed for the establishment of minimum wage rates (referred to as 
wage determination) in industries or occupations not covered by statutory negotiation structures. 
It seems unlikely, however, that the apartheid regime used these tools to favour African workers. 
Despite the discouragement of African trade unions activity, several unions were created and 
took different forms:  
• Parallel unions (working with liberal registered unions). 
• Independent unions. 
• Non-racial unions. 
• Exclusively African unions, linked to the Africanist or the Black Consciousness movements.  
These African trade unions attempted to make up for the lack of representation by making 
themselves recognised at the plant level. The first recognition agreement of a black union was 
signed in 1974. However, it does not seem that they really contributed to shifting the 
discriminatory trend until the 1980s. 
In 1979, following the Wiehahn Commission recommendations, participation in statutory 
collective bargaining was opened to every trade union. This radical change was mainly due to the 
will of the government to improve control over African unions and to prevent the proliferation of 
plant-level recognition agreements. Nevertheless, it did not stop the development of a two-tier 
negotiation system. The 1980s witnessed an increase in African membership and bargaining 
power of emerging African and multi-racial trade unions, while White unions lost a lot of their 
influence.  
2.3 Unionisation and wages, by population group 
Table 1 shows that in 1997, the unionisation rate was approximately 34.4 percent, placing South 
Africa among the highest unionised developing countries. According to Salmon (1999), the 
average unionisation rate for developing countries is about 18 percent, which increases to 43 
percent for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Table 1 shows that African workers have a higher unionisation rate than Whites, since 38 percent 
of African employees are unionised, whereas only 23 percent of Whites are union members. 
Table 1: Unionisation According to Population Groups, 1997 
Total sampleb African workers White workers 
Unionisation ratea 34.4% 38% 23.3% 
Notes: 
a Defined as the number of unionised / total employment (excluding self-employment). 
b Representative sample of 24457 workers (15613 Africans and 3070 Whites). 
Source: Computations using OHS 1997 data sets. 
Figures 1 and 2 present histograms of the earnings of unionised and non-unionised African and 
White workers. It is clear that the earnings distribution for unionised African workers is higher 
than the earnings distribution for non-unionised African workers. Furthermore, the earnings 
distribution for unionised African workers is spread more narrowly than for non-unionised African 
workers, revealing higher rates of wage equality for unionised African workers. Earnings 
distributions for White workers are similar whether they are unionised or not. However, the pike 
of the distribution for unionised White workers is slightly higher than the one for non-unionised 
White workers. 
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Figure 1: African earnings distribution, regular workers, 1997  
Hourly earnings(ln)
 Unionized Africans  Non unionized Africans






Source: OHS 1997. 
Figure 2: White earnings distribution, regular workers, 1997 
Hourly earnings(ln)
 Unionized Whites  Non unionized Whites






Source: OHS 1997. 
Table 2: Average Hourly Net Earnings by Population Groups and Union Status, 1997 
Earnings  
Union Status  
African Workers White Workers Ratio of Earnings 
of Whites to 
Africans 
Union members 11.6 25 2.24 
Non-union members 6.2 27.4 4.4 
Total sample 8.2 26.7 3.3 
Ratio of Earnings of 
unionised to non-unionised 
1.8 0.9  
Source: Computations using OHS 1997 data sets. 
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Table 2 displays earnings by union status for African and White workers. Not surprisingly, on 
average, African union members earn more than non-union members (about 46 percent more). 
On the other hand, the figures for White workers show the opposite: the average gross wage for 
unionised White workers is about 9 percent less than for non-unionised workers. Thus, the racial 
wage gap is larger in the non-union sector than in the union sector. 
The following two sections estimate the real influence trade unions have on the wage 
differential among and between African and White workers. Section 3 evaluates the size of the 
union/non-union wage differential for African and for White workers respectively, taking into 
account their personal characteristics. Section 4 determines whether racial wage discrimination is 
lower among unionised workers or non-unionised workers. 
3. The union earnings premium 
3.1 Econometric specification 
Among the several specifications of the union wage premium, we retain here the four most often 
used in the literature. They differ depending on whether they consider that the union status is 
endogenous, that there are different earnings regimes among union and non-union members and 
whether they take into account a sample selection problem.  
• A single earnings equation with an exogenous union membership dummy variable. 
ln w X Ui i i i= + +β γ ε              (1) 
Where Ui is the union status of the worker i (=1 if is a union member, 0 otherwise) and X i , a 
vector of exogenous characteristics3. It can be shown that this specification, which does not take 
into account the problem of self-selection, leads to an overestimate of unionisation on earnings.  
• The single earnings equation with an exogenous union membership dummy variable, with 
adjustment for sample selection. 
ln w X Ui i i i i= + + +β γ δλ ε            (2) 
Where λi  is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the estimate of a probit model of union 
membership. The union earnings premium is: [ exp( $)γ − 1 ]. 












n= +β η          (4) 
Where u denotes union sector and n, non-union sector. 
• Separate earnings regime among union and non-union members, with endogenous switching 








u= + +β β λ η1 2         (5) 














n et  are computed from the estimate of a probit model of union membership.  
The union earnings premium is: ( [ ]$ exp ( )µ β β= − −u n X 1 ), where the vector X  contains 
the means of the variables computed on the union, non union or the whole sample, depending 
on the economist’s choice. 
Comparing the two last methods, Lewis (1986), in his review of the American studies on the 
union wage premium, prefers the OLS specification even if it is biased. Indeed, ES estimates are 
much more spread than the OLS but not systematically higher or lower. Furthermore, ES results 
are highly sensitive to the variables introduced in the earnings equations and the union 
membership probit model, to the assumptions on the distribution of the disturbance etc.  
Because none of these methods has proved its superiority, we test the sensitivity of our results 
to the different specifications.  
3.2 Prior works 
Previous studies on the South African union/non-union wage differential display heterogeneity of 
results depending on the specifications and the data used. Table 3 presents four of them, 
essentially devoted to the estimate of the African union wage premium. All of them conclude 
that, at the beginning of the 1990s, unionised African workers earn significantly more than non-
unionised workers. Applying the first specification (equation (1)) to the determination of the 
premium for male Africans workers, Mwabu and Schultz (1998) and Hofmeyr and Lucas (1998) 
agree on a 20 percent result. However, when other methodologies are used, the extent of the 
union wage premium differs considerably, from 15 percent to 100 percent (ibid). Only Mwabu 
and Schultz estimate the White union wage premium, but do not find it significant.  
The interest of this study is to continue this research with a more recent data set (OHS 1997) 
and to estimate the White union earnings premium as well as the African union earnings 
premium.  
Table 3: Synthesis of a few prior works on the union earnings premium in South Africa 
Authors Methodology Data Union earnings premium 




Between 10% and 24% 
Moll (1995) (1) OHS (1994) 
African workers 
Between 26% and 43% 
depending on the skill and 
the economic sector. 
Mwabu and 
Schultz (1998) 
(1) PSLSD (1993) 
African male workers: 












African male workers 
 
Between -8% and 72% 
Between 15% and 100% 
                                                                                                                                            
3 A variable that corrects for the bias linked to participation to the labour force is introduced in the vector X. This variable is 
computed from a multinomial logit model of employment status: unemployed and casual, independent, regular.  
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3.3 Data and variables 
The data are derived from the 1997 October Household Survey conducted by Statistics South 
Africa. The survey covers 30 000 households of all races.  
Self-employed as well as workers with non-positive or unspecified wages are omitted from the 
sample. Observations with missing data on any variable included in the earnings functions were 
disregarded. The sample consists of 7984 African and 1474 White male wage earnings 
employees. 
Two sets of equations require specification of variables: the union membership and the 
earnings equations4.  
3.3.1 Determinants of union membership 
The independent variables in the probit include human capital variables. Educational qualifications 
are represented by four dummy variables, for primary schooling, secondary schooling, technical 
and university education. The expected signs of their coefficients are not clear. They can be 
negative if better-educated workers prefer individual strategies for promotion and for redress of 
grievances or positive if the union or the employer select individuals on the basis of education 
(Moll, 1993). Two variables of experience and tenure in the current job are introduced. They may 
reflect the worker’s desire for union voice. Dummies of the degree of qualification of 
occupational categories are also included. 
Industry dummies could indicate the degree of monopoly union power and its associated lower 
organising costs (Booth, 1986). They may also proxy for firm size. A dummy for formal sector is 
also introduced. 
An urban dummy is included as a proxy for organising cost and social customs. A dummy for 
marriage is traditionally included because marriage is thought to increase the worker’s desire for 
job security, which can be increased through union intervention. A dummy Other union indicates 
whether there are other persons in the household who are also union members. According to 
Moll (1993), this variable reflects household-specific tastes for unionisation, such as political 
orientation and the willingness to invest union dues for the sake of long security and wage gains. 
The probit also includes the ratio of young in the household to the number of earners 
(dependence). It is assumed that workers with great financial responsibilities at home are more 
likely than others to join a union, as a means of security. A dummy denoting the presence of 
unemployed persons in the household (unemployed) is also included for the same purpose. 
Finally the probit includes a dummy migration indicating whether the individual has left his/her 
birthplace. In the case of migration, unionisation can be a way of integrating a new social or 
political network. 
3.3.2 Determinants of earnings 
The explanatory variable in the earnings equation include some of the independent variables 
previously presented: the standard human capital measures (education, experience, seniority). To 
avoid an eventual problem of endogeneity, the dummies for being in highly skilled, skilled and 
semi-skilled occupations are replaced by the estimated probabilities that the individual will be in 
such kinds of occupations5. Other common variables to the two sets of equations are the marital 
status, the industry sectors, the nature of the sector (formal or not), the type of area (urban or 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 1 for further details on the variables.  
5 These probabilities are estimated by a logit multinomial model of occupational attainment. These estimates are available from 
the author.  
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not). In addition, regional dummies are included to take into account the differences in the costs 
of living between the nine provinces. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly earnings, defined as the total salary 
(including overtime and bonus) before any deduction of taxes, insurance payments, pensions 
contribution etc. Introducing hourly earnings allows that differences in hours worked are 
controlled for. 
3.4 Results of estimation 
Results of the estimates of the union membership probit model and the earnings equations – (1) 
to (6) – for the two sub samples of African and White male workers are respectively given in 
Appendices 2 and 3. For the sake of simplicity, these results are not discussed here. Table 4 
presents the union/non-union earnings differentials obtained from these various estimates.  
Table 4: Union/non-union wage differential among African and White male workers,  
              1997 
  Africans  Whites 
Methodology Equations Premium (t) or (F) a Premium (t) 
One equation  (1) 16.6*** 8.02 -3.8 -0.81 
      
One equation (with 
self-selection 
correction) 
(2) 35.7*** 2.80 -52.4*** -4.21 
      
Two equations (OLS)b (3)-(4) 13.1*** 2.85 -0.6*** 1.07 
      
Switching equations  b, c (5)-(6) 19.6*** 3.02 -57.9*** 1.18 
Notes 
a Significance of the union wage premium is tested by a Student test when one equation is estimated (1) or (2). A Chow 
test (F test) tests the significance of the premium in the two last cases, by testing the constancy of the coefficients 
between the two equations. (See Appendix 4).  
b X is determinate on the sample of the non-unionised workers.  
c X does not include the variable correcting for self-selection. (See Lewis, 1986: 49).  
***statistically significant at the 1% level. 
It appears from these results that, whatever the methodology used, unionised African workers 
earn significantly more than non-unionised workers. If we retain the switching model as the most 
credible one (Moll, 1993), it seems that an individual, who has the average characteristics of the 
non-unionised workers, will earn, if he/she becomes a union member, 20 percent more than if 
he/she remains non-unionised. It should be noted that these results are similar to those found four 
years earlier, but not with the same methodology, by Mwabu and Schultz (1998) and Hofmeyr 
and Lucas (1998). Considering White workers, the union/non-union differential is much more 
sensitive to the specification used. In the four cases, the union premium is negative and clearly 
higher when it incorporates a correction for self-selection. According to the switching model, an 
individual, endowed with the average characteristics of the non-unionised workers, suffers a wage 
loss of 58 percent if he/she decides to unionise. However, the extent and the significance of this 
result is surprising compared to the conclusions of the previous studies and should thus be 
appreciated. 
How can we explain firstly that a union/non-union wage differential appears within the South 
African bargaining system and secondly that only African workers benefit from such a premium? 
Indeed, the compulsory centralised bargaining system in South Africa is expected to reduce 
within industry union/non-union wage differentials. Moll (1995) sets out three arguments to 
explain that the premium remains substantial for Africans: 
D P R U  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o . 0 1 / 4 8   S a n d r i n e  R o s p a b e  
 10
10 
• First, the enforcement of the Industrial Council rulings is incomplete.  
• Second, there is a wage differential between the formal sector where the Industrial Council 
rulings are applied and the informal sector where they are not.  
• Third, additional union-management agreements within industries covered by Industrial 
Council rulings enable workers in specific firms to enjoy wage levels higher than those 
specified by the Industrial Councils.  
It should be noted that this union earnings premium, usually treated as an indicator of wage 
bargaining power of unions, can also reflect some compensation for differences in working 
conditions or fringe benefits from union and non-union jobs (Duncan and Stafford, 1980). Union 
organisational efforts can also alter the productivity of the unionised labour force and hence the 
derived demand for union workers (Freeman, 1980). 
The fact that only African workers receive this union wage premium can be accounted for by 
differences in employment opportunities for Africans and Whites in the non-union sector, along 
dimensions such as firm size and capital intensity, that we cannot measure (Mwabu and Schultz, 
1998). African non-union employment may be concentrated in small, low-technology firms, 
whereas White non-union employment may occur more often in larger firms using relatively more 
advanced technologies. Moreover, though an increasing proportion of unionised White workers 
have joined multi-racial unions, many White workers retain their membership with declining 
White unions. The weak wage bargaining power of these unions could explain the value of the 
premium, while others compensations (job security for example) justify their membership.  
As the wage influence of South African unions is significantly positive among African workers 
but negligible or unfavourable for Whites, one can deduce that the labour movement can play a 
role in the reduction of racial wage inequalities. In the next section, we estimate, other things 
being equal, whether racial wage differential is lower among unionised workers. Specifically, this 
study seeks to evaluate the union impact on wage discrimination between White and African 
workers. 
4. The influence of unions on racial wage inequality and discrimination 
Most of the studies on wage discrimination using the standard Oaxaca’s decomposition of the 
earnings gap, whenever they consider the union influence, incorporate a dummy for the union 
membership in the earnings equations. The interest of the methodology used here is to take into 
account the factors affecting unionisation of White and African workers rather than simply 
treating the union status as exogenously determined6.  
4.1 The methodology 
The simultaneous equations model retained is presented in Appendix 5. Decomposition of the 
earnings differential between White and African workers is as follows: 
                                                 
6 See Doiron and Riddell (1994) for the insufficiencies of an analysis based on the exogeneity of unionization. 
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Where,  
u = union sector, n = non-union sector, a = Africans and w = Whites 
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* * * *,  ,    et 1 2  are estimated from the whole sample of 
African and White workers (Neumark, 1988). 
The term U of equation (7) represents the portion of the earnings gap due to White-African 
differences in union membership. Its first component can be explained by differences between 
White and African workers in the observable determinants of the union status. The last two 
elements form the unexplained component of the gap in unionism and have various origins. It 
may result from unobserved racial differences in characteristics that affect the demand for 
unionism (such as labour market attachment, working conditions, employer size). It may also 
reflect the discriminatory behavior of unions or employers. A selective recruitment union policy 
or a discriminatory hiring process can reduce the unionisation rate of the discriminated against 
workers.  
The terms WU and WN are associated with racial differences in earnings in the union and non-
union sector respectively. In each of these terms, the first component represents the skill or 
productivity advantage of White workers over African workers in the absence of discrimination. It 
is the portion of the earnings gap explained by racial differences in productive characteristics. The 
following two elements are the part of the racial earnings differential that can be assimilated, 
subject to the usual precautions7, to wage discrimination. This discrimination component is made 
up of two terms. The first one – the favoured group advantage – represents the amount by which 
White productive characteristics are overcompensated relative to a discrimination-free setting. 
The other one – the non-favoured group disadvantage – reflects the amount by which African 
productive characteristics are undervalued. 
                                                 
7 Estimates may actually overstate or understate the true level of discrimination owing to measurement errors in the data or 
omission of productive characteristics (job training, motivation), which can be hardly observable or measurable. 
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4.2 The results 
The estimation process includes three steps that have to be reproduced for each of the 
population group:  
• Estimation of a reduced-form union membership probit. Computation of the inverse of Mill’s 
ratio.  
• Estimation of the earnings equations in the union and non-union sectors, correcting for the 
biases due to self-selection in unionisation. 
• Estimation of a structural-form union membership probit, incorporating the estimated 
union/non-union wage differential. 
Table 5 presents the results of the decomposition of the racial earnings gap: 
Table 5: Decomposition of the earnings gap between White and African male workers, 
1997 
Estimated hourly earnings (ln) 
Whites 3.087 
Africans 1.732 
Earnings gap 1.355 
Decomposition of the earnings gap 
 Value    % of the earnings gap 
Unionisation (U) -0.086  -6.3% 
Explained component 0.027  2% 
Unexplained component -0.113  -8.3% 
• White advantage -0.101  (-7.4%) 
• African disadvantage -0.012  (-0.9%) 
Earnings (union sector) (WU) 0.292  21.6% 
Explained component 0.198  14.6% 
Unexplained component 0.095  7% 
• White advantage 0.086  (6.3%) 
• African disadvantage 0.009  (0.7%) 
Earnings (non-union sector) (WN) 1.149  84.8% 
Explained component 1  73.7% 
Unexplained component 0.149  11% 
• White advantage 0.115  (8.5%) 
• African disadvantage 0.034  (2.5%) 
Notes: Tests of significance of the racial differences in the unionisation probabilities and in average earnings in the union 
and non-union sectors are presented in Appendix 6. 
Table 5 shows that the earnings advantage that White workers have over African workers can 
not be explained, even partially, by the gap in unionisation rates which is negative and thus 
reduces the earnings gap by 6 percent. On average, White workers have a lower unionisation 
rate than African workers. This situation results from unexplained differences not related to 
observable characteristics. We should be cautious in interpreting this White unionisation 
disadvantage only in terms of discrimination in default of controlling for all the unobserved 
variables that affect the union status. Whites’ lower unionisation rate can also be explained by 
their reluctance to become members of unions that have traditionally defended African interests.  
The White-African earnings gap in the union sector and in the non-union sector respectively 
account for 20 percent and 85 percent of the average differential. In both cases, the major 
portion of the gap is explained by the fact that Whites have higher observable productive 
endowments than Africans. However, these endowments are more evenly matched among White 
and African unionised workers than among non-unionised workers. If we consider, with the usual 
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reserves, that the unexplained portion of these gaps can be attributed to discrimination then, 
results indicate that discrimination is lower in the union sector. This remark shows that, other 
things being equal, South African unions could have an influence on the reduction of the earnings 
gap between White and African workers.  
5. Conclusion 
The first important result of this econometric study is that South African trade unions have 
significant wage bargaining power but that it only serves African workers’ interests. The value of 
the African earnings union premium (approximately 20 percent) falls in the higher developing 
countries range. In Malaysia, Ghana, Mexico and Bangladesh the union/non-union wage 
differential exceeds 10 percent (Salmon, 1999). If we compare our result with those found in 
developed countries, it is closer to the higher American range than to the lower European range. 
Blanchflower and Freeman (1990) demonstrate a contrast between the United States, where the 
union effect is some 20 percent and West Germany, Austria, Australia and Switzerland, which 
have small union effects, between 4 percent and 8 percent. These authors stress that countries 
with centralised wage setting have relatively small premia. The union effect for African workers is 
consistent with this remark, because it is probably partly due to the decentralised plant-level 
activities of the unions.  
The second important result of this paper is that the racial earnings gap, and more restrictively 
wage discrimination, originates mainly in the non-union sector. This would mean that unions have 
played a role in filling in the racial wage gap. We assume that the emerging unions have the most 
important influence in this reduction that began in the 1980s. This econometric study also finds 
that the largest portion of the earnings differential is due to racially unequal productive 
endowments. This is partly the result of discrimination prior the market which influences the 
workers’ acquisition of human capital.  
The econometric results presented in this paper thus points to the legal framework for industrial 
relations, insofar as it affects the political economy of trade unionism, and to the policy towards 
human capital development, as the two crucial elements of a policy aiming at making the South 
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Dependent :  
Union membership = 1 if is a union member 
Earnings 
(LNREVH) 
Logarithm of the hourly earnings 
Independent :  
Common variables (determination of the union status and the earnings) 
Primary schooling a x,       0 x 7
7,       x > 7




where x = years of schooling 
Secondary schooling 0,          x 7
x -7,      7 < x 12









where x = years of schooling 
Technical diploma =1 if holds a technical or professional diploma (artisan, teacher etc.) 
University diploma =1 if holds a university diploma (degree, honours, master’s, doctor’s) 
Experience = age - years of schooling - 6 
Experience ² = experience square 
Seniority = years of seniority within the present firm 
Seniority ² = seniority square 
Married =1 if married, civilly, traditionally  
Formal sector = 1 if works in the formal sector (fiscal registration of the employer) 
Urban =1 if lives in a urban area 
Economic sector = dummy variables : agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity, 
construction, trade, transport, finances, services, domestic.  
Specific variables (determination of the union status) 
Migration =1 if has left his area of birth 
Occupational status = dummy variables: highly skilled, skilled, no skill  
Dependence ratio = ratio of young people in the household to the number of earners 
(independent or regular) 
Unemployed = if people (other than the individual) in the household are 
unemployed 
Other union = if workers (other than the individual) in the household are 
unionised 
Specific variables (determination of the earnings) 
Occupational status  = estimated probabilities that the individual, once taking into 
account his/her characteristics, be highly skilled, skilled or semi-
skilled b 
Regions = dummy variables : Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, 
Free State, Kwazulu Natal, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, 
Northern Province  
λp  = correcting variable for the selection bias of participation  
λs  = correcting variable for the selection bias of unionisation 
a Cf. Moll (1995) for the same kind of process. 
b These probabilities (estimated in a multinomial logit model) are introduced to correct for a potential endogeneity 









DETERMINANTS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP 
 
• The reduced form 
 
Africans  Whites 
Dependent variable :  
Union status 
Coefficient t-student  Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.017* 1.85  0.062 1.19 
Secondary schooling 0.054*** 5.32  -0.154*** -3.50 
Technical diploma 0.187** 2.49  -0.061 -0.62 
Univ. diploma 0.078 0.63  -0.340** -2.52 
Experience 0.029*** 4.97  0.025* 1.82 
Experience ² 0.000*** -4.75  -0.001*** -2.71 
Seniority 0.064*** 10.12  0.042*** 4.14 
Seniority ² -0.001*** -5.58  0.000* -1.74 
Skilled 0.012 0.22  0.242*** 2.75 
No skill 0.017 0.28  -0.022 -0.11 
Married 0.105** 2.54  0.486*** 3.56 
Dependence ratio 0.031** 2.33  0.011 0.24 
Unemployed 0.005 0.13  0.145 0.96 
Other union 0.789*** 11.46  1.441*** 7.93 
Formal sector 0.957*** 13.36  0.605** 2.10 
Urban 0.035 0.85  0.556*** 2.68 
Migration 0.114*** 3.20  -0.216** -2.38 
Agriculturea -1.184*** -16.10  0.299 1.09 
Mining 0.525*** 8.10  0.544*** 3.49 
Electricity -0.319*** -3.00  0.385* 1.89 
Construction -0.771*** -11.25  -0.709*** -2.68 
Trade -0.493*** -9.05  -0.161 -1.22 
Transport -0.147** -2.32  0.401*** 2.92 
Finances -0.701*** -9.27  -0.272* -1.81 
Services -0.019 -0.36  0.400*** 3.55 
Domestic -0.695*** -6.44  -0.723 -1.35 
Western Capeb 0.049 0.60  0.042 0.38 
Northern Cape 0.267*** 3.86  -0.002 -0.01 
Eastern Cape 0.087 0.81  0.086 0.51 
Orange Free State 0.138** 2.41  0.135 0.84 
Natal 0.003 0.05  0.137 0.89 
North West -0.115** -1.96  0.603*** 3.71 
Mpumalanga 0.107* 1.79  0.695*** 4.97 
Northern Province 0.109 1.55  0.367 1.34 
Constant -2.051*** -14.47  -2.307*** -4.95 
Pseudo R² 0.2375  0.2011 
% correctly predicted 73.8  76.6 
N 7984  1474 
Notes: 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and *  the 10% level. 
a Reference category : Manufacturing. 
b Reference category : Gauteng. 
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• The structural form 
 
 Africans  Whites  
Dependent variable :  
Union status  
Coefficient t-student  Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.018** 1.99  0.066 1.28 
Secondary schooling 0.054*** 5.28  -0.146*** -3.31 
Technical diploma 0.196*** 2.61  -0.082 -0.85 
University diploma 0.100 0.78  -0.338** -2.49 
Experience 0.029*** 4.97  0.023* 1.75 
Experience ² 0.000*** -4.70  -0.001*** -2.58 
Seniority 0.063*** 9.90  0.041*** 3.86 
Seniority ² -0.001*** -5.54  0.000* -1.69 
Skilled 0.013 0.24  0.263*** 3.05 
No skill 0.023 0.36  0.020 0.11 
Married 0.107** 2.55  0.514*** 3.88 
Dependence ratio 0.034*** 2.57  0.035 0.74 
Unemployed -0.002 -0.05  0.171 1.09 
Other union 0.788*** 10.64  1.437*** 7.74 
Formal sector 0.929*** 11.04  0.615** 2.18 
Urban 0.046 1.01  0.637*** 2.92 
Migration 0.106*** 2.99  -0.190** -2.12 
Agriculturea -1.145*** -14.45  0.324 1.18 
Mining 0.520*** 7.38  0.685*** 4.79 
Electricity -0.291*** -2.74  0.533** 2.41 
Construction -0.747*** -10.89  -0.662*** -2.58 
Trade -0.489*** -8.79  -0.154 -1.17 
Transport -0.138** -2.15  0.371*** 2.72 
Finances -0.694*** -9.21  -0.320** -2.14 
Services 0.012 0.23  0.360*** 3.19 
Domestic -0.695*** -6.38  -0.725 -1.38 
Fitted wage differential 0.042 0.25  0.138 0.76 
Constant -2.009*** -14.39  -2.389*** -4.77 
Pseudo R² 0.2341  0.1824 
% correctly predicted 74.1  75.6 
N 7984  1474 
Notes :  
*** statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and *  the 10% level.  

















DETERMINANTS OF EARNINGS 
 
• Wage equations : with a union dummy  
 (1) without correcting for the selection bias of unionisation. 
 
Africans  Whites 
Dependent variable :  
ln (hourly earnings) 
Coefficient t-student  Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.022*** 4.38  0.022 0.66 
Secondary schooling 0.012 0.81  -0.002 -0.05 
Technical diploma 0.225** 2.10  0.004 0.05 
Univ. diploma 0.473*** 3.31  -0.005 -0.04 
Experience -0.015*** -2.82  0.000 0.01 
Experience ² 0.000*** 2.86  0.000 0.60 
Seniority 0.024*** 8.84  0.020*** 4.10 
Seniority ² -0.000*** -4.63  -0.000** -2.30 
Skilled -0.245 -1.16  -1.089*** -3.06 
No skill -1.839*** -4.46  -2.138** -2.48 
Unionised 0.153*** 8.03  -0.039 -0.81 
Married -0.047 -1.58  0.063 0.75 
Formal sector 0.224*** 6.69  -0.278* -1.70 
Urban 0.162*** 6.85  -0.278* -1.92 
Agriculturea -0.595*** -8.95  -0.462*** -3.15 
Mining -0.128*** -2.84  0.298*** 2.75 
Electricity 0.120* 1.79  0.170 1.30 
Construction -0.111** -2.31  -0.162 -1.45 
Trade -0.271*** -7.01  -0.118 -1.50 
Transport -0.217*** -3.69  0.066 0.94 
Finances -0.260*** -4.61  -0.005 -0.05 
Services 0.101*** 2.77  -0.126** -1.98 
Domestic -0.371*** -6.66  -0.199 -0.60 
Western Capeb -0.115*** -2.85  -0.085 -1.50 
Northern Cape -0.304*** -7.83  -0.056 -0.48 
Eastern Cape -0.333*** -5.97  -0.338*** -2.95 
Orange Free State -0.400*** -12.49  -0.356*** -5.06 
Natal -0.099*** -3.60  -0.113 -1.54 
North West -0.184*** -6.26  -0.571*** -4.57 
Mpumalanga -0.250*** -7.99  -0.139** -1.97 
Northern Province -0.207*** -5.79  -0.319* -1.85 
λp  0.413*** 5.83  0.837*** 2.81 
Constant 2.397*** 8.56  4.272*** 7.10 
Observations 7984  1474 
Adj R-squared 0.4449  0.2160 
F observed 180.72  14.43 
Notes: 
 *** statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and *  the 10% level.  
a Reference category : Manufacturing. 
b Reference category : Gauteng. 
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• Wage equations : with a union dummy  
 (2) with a correction for the selection bias of unionisation. 
 
 Africans  Whites 
Dependent variable :  
ln (hourly earnings) 
Coefficient t-student Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.021*** 4.22 0.034 1.00 
Secondary schooling 0.011 0.74 -0.021 -0.44 
Technical diploma 0.232** 2.16 0.011 0.14 
Univ. diploma 0.490*** 3.41 -0.020 -0.13 
Experience -0.016*** -2.95 0.003 0.37 
Experience ² 0.000*** 2.99 0.000 0.02 
Seniority 0.021*** 5.80 0.030*** 5.31 
Seniority ² 0.000*** -3.41 0.000*** -3.42 
Skilled -0.213 -1.00 -0.882*** -2.58 
No skill -1.794*** -4.34 -1.928** -2.25 
Unionised 0.305*** 2.80 -0.743*** -4.21 
Married -0.049 -1.64 0.133 1.50 
Formal sector 0.194*** 4.81 -0.138 -0.87 
Urban 0.157*** 6.58 -0.187 -1.26 
Agriculturea -0.543*** -7.07 -0.415*** -2.81 
Mining -0.153*** -3.14 0.402*** 3.58 
Electricity 0.135** 2.00 0.231* 1.77 
Construction -0.071 -1.29 -0.274** -2.38 
Trade -0.242*** -5.61 -0.161** -2.04 
Transport -0.206*** -3.49 0.131* 1.84 
Finances -0.219*** -3.49 -0.051 -0.59 
Services 0.107*** 2.90 -0.065 -1.01 
Domestic -0.334*** -5.43 -0.300 -0.91 
Western Capeb -0.115*** -2.84 -0.076 -1.34 
Northern Cape -0.316*** -7.97 -0.050 -0.42 
Eastern Cape -0.337*** -6.03 -0.313 -2.80 
Orange Free State -0.405*** -12.58 -0.330*** -4.79 
Natal -0.100*** -3.61 -0.093 -1.27 
North West -0.180*** -6.11 -0.422*** -3.24 
Mpumalanga -0.256*** -8.05 0.026 0.33 
Northern Province -0.212*** -5.88 -0.244 -1.41 
λp  0.410*** 5.80 0.877*** 2.95 
λs  -0.093 -1.40 0.442*** 4.10 
Constant 2.345*** 8.34 4.012*** 6.80 
Observations 7984 1474 
Adj R-squared 0.4451 0.2249 
F observed 175.36 14.28 
Notes: 
 *** statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and *  the 10% level.  
a Reference category : Manufacturing. 
b Reference category : Gauteng. 
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• Wage equations : African and white samples 
 (3)-(4) without correcting for the selection bias of unionisation. 
 
AFRICAN WORKERS SAMPLE 
 
Unionised Africans Non-unionised Africans  
Dependent variable :  
ln (hourly earnings) 
Coefficient t-student  Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.010 1.28  0.025*** 3.87 
Secondary schooling 0.025 1.25  0.007 0.36 
Technical diploma 0.427*** 2.90  0.079 0.49 
Univ. diploma 0.638*** 3.38  0.402* 1.77 
Experience -0.022*** -2.82  -0.011 -1.54 
Experience ² 0.000*** 2.88  0.000 1.46 
Seniority 0.021*** 5.66  0.026*** 7.06 
Seniority ² 0.000*** -2.81  0.000*** -3.78 
Skilled 0.180 0.59  -0.556* -1.77 
No skill -1.358** -2.39  -2.143*** -3.52 
Married -0.079** -1.96  -0.021 -0.48 
Formal sector 0.496*** 5.62  0.168*** 4.50 
Urban 0.088*** 2.77  0.214*** 6.26 
Agriculturea -0.427*** -3.59  -0.576*** -6.39 
Mining -0.154*** -2.63  -0.015 -0.20 
Electricity 0.090 0.89  0.160* 1.78 
Construction -0.152* -1.73  -0.094 -1.47 
Trade -0.225*** -3.98  -0.292*** -5.35 
Transport -0.189** -2.36  -0.243*** -2.80 
Finances -0.257*** -2.97  -0.262*** -3.39 
Services 0.136*** 2.80  0.087 1.54 
Domestic -0.320*** -2.85  -0.385*** -5.88 
Western Capeb -0.028 -0.43  -0.188*** -3.63 
Northern Cape -0.208*** -3.84  -0.388*** -7.03 
Eastern Cape -0.103 -1.33  -0.482*** -6.40 
Orange Free State -0.376*** -9.64  -0.433*** -8.80 
Natal -0.034 -0.89  -0.168*** -4.31 
North West -0.066 -1.58  -0.281*** -6.79 
Mpumalanga -0.238*** -5.31  -0.280*** -6.45 
Northern Province -0.110** -2.23  -0.293*** -5.81 
λp  0.618*** 5.28  0.311*** 3.48 
Constant 2.122*** 5.20  2.629*** 6.37 
Observations 3479  4505 
Adj R-squared 0.3153  0.4194 
F observed 56.28  96.26 
Notes: 
 *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level.  
a Reference category : Manufacturing. 
b Reference category : Gauteng. 
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WHITE WORKERS SAMPLE 
 
Unionised Whites  Non-unionised Whites  
Dependent variable :  
ln (hourly earnings) 
Coefficient t-student  Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.043 0.95  0.005 0.12 
Secondary schooling -0.083 -1.05  0.043 0.71 
Technical diploma -0.100 -0.67  0.056 0.62 
Univ. diploma -0.269 -1.01  0.108 0.60 
Experience -0.014 -0.80  0.007 0.58 
Experience ² 0.000 1.12  0.000 -0.02 
Seniority 0.029*** 3.50  0.017** 2.52 
Seniority ² 0.000** -2.57  0.000 -1.20 
Skilled -1.738*** -2.98  -0.831* -1.87 
No skill -2.112 -1.29  -1.749* -1.82 
Married -0.043 -0.28  0.117 1.18 
Formal sector -0.690 -1.39  -0.183 -1.03 
Urban -1.007*** -3.52  -0.171 -1.02 
Agriculturea -0.361* -1.78  -0.525*** -2.98 
Mining 0.431** 2.34  0.206 1.41 
Electricity 0.451*** 2.71  -0.077 -0.40 
Construction -0.075 -0.26  -0.156 -1.27 
Trade -0.238 -1.38  -0.096 -1.08 
Transport 0.117 1.28  0.062 0.63 
Finances 0.098 0.56  -0.018 -0.18 
Services -0.019 -0.20  -0.157* -1.91 
Domestic -1.126*** -3.81  -0.187 -0.54 
Western Capeb 0.077 0.93  -0.163** -2.31 
Northern Cape -0.067 -0.49  -0.085 -0.55 
Eastern Cape -0.346 -1.55  -0.360*** -2.78 
Orange Free State -0.393*** -3.28  -0.376*** -4.07 
Natal -0.364*** -3.02  -0.056 -0.63 
North West -0.405** -2.35  -0.726*** -3.51 
Mpumalanga -0.158 -1.50  -0.151 -1.49 
Northern Province -0.052 -0.27  -0.505 -1.80 
λp  1.948*** 3.18  0.587* 1.66 
Constant 6.445*** 5.38  3.645*** 5.20 
Observations 447  1027 
Adj R-squared 0.2516  0.2297 
F observed 241.28  12.47 
Notes: 
 *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level.  
a Reference category : Manufacturing. 
b Reference category : Gauteng. 
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• Wage equations : African and white samples 
 (5)-(6) with a correction for the selection bias of unionisation. 
 
AFRICAN WORKERS SAMPLE 
 
Unionised Africans Non-unionised Africans   
Dependent variable :  
ln (hourly earnings) 
Coefficient t-student  Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.011 1.42  0.022*** 3.47 
Secondary schooling 0.028 1.40  0.006 0.28 
Technical diploma 0.447*** 3.04  0.119 0.74 
University diploma 0.655*** 3.48  0.493** 2.11 
Experience -0.021*** -2.70  -0.013* -1.91 
Experience ² 0.000*** 2.75  0.000* 1.86 
Seniority 0.025*** 5.09  0.018*** 3.57 
Seniority ² 0.000*** -3.10  0.000** -2.28 
Skilled 0.210 0.70  -0.390 -1.22 
No skill -1.353** -2.39  -1.931*** -3.16 
Married -0.080** -1.98  -0.028 -0.63 
Formal sector 0.571*** 5.73  0.086* 1.76 
Urban 0.091*** 2.86  0.198*** 5.73 
Agriculturea -0.522*** -3.53  -0.437*** -4.19 
Mining -0.127** -2.04  -0.112 -1.29 
Electricity 0.067 0.65  0.203** 2.25 
Construction -0.210** -2.17  0.016 0.21 
Trade -0.260*** -4.18  -0.210*** -3.40 
Transport -0.203** -2.53  -0.209** -2.39 
Finances -0.308*** -3.22  -0.145 -1.65 
Services 0.136*** 2.80  0.102* 1.80 
Domestic -0.379*** -3.07  -0.285*** -3.78 
Western Capeb -0.024 -0.37  -0.189*** -3.63 
Northern Cape -0.191*** -3.42  -0.419*** -7.51 
Eastern Cape -0.094 -1.20  -0.490*** -6.48 
Orange Free State -0.370*** -9.37  -0.447*** -9.04 
Natal -0.033 -0.86  -0.169*** -4.33 
North West -0.072* -1.73  -0.268*** -6.43 
Mpumalanga -0.229*** -5.00  -0.296*** -6.73 
Northern Province -0.105** -2.12  -0.308*** -6.07 
λp  0.630*** 5.37  0.315*** 3.53 
λs  0.114 1.24  -0.285*** -2.65 
Constant 1.900*** 4.37  2.415*** 5.76 
Observations 3479  4505 
Adj R-squared 0.316  0.420 
F observed 55.4  93.5 
Notes:  
*** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level.  
a Reference category : Manufacturing. 
b Reference category : Gauteng. 
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WHITE WORKERS SAMPLE 
 
Unionised whites  Non-unionised whites   
Dependent variable :  
ln (hourly earnings) 
Coefficient t-student  Coefficient t-student 
Primary schooling 0.060 1.34  0.018 0.39 
Secondary schooling -0.111 -1.43  0.020 0.33 
Technical diploma -0.108 -0.74  0.072 0.81 
University diploma -0.348 -1.32  0.101 0.56 
Experience -0.017 -0.97  0.014 1.31 
Experience ² 0.000 1.20  0.000 -0.91 
Seniority 0.041*** 4.85  0.030*** 3.64 
Seniority ² 0.000*** -3.66  0.000** -2.21 
Skilled -1.588*** -2.78  -0.538 -1.30 
No skill -2.163 -1.35  -1.412 -1.47 
Married -0.002 -0.02  0.224** 1.98 
Formal sector -0.468 -1.02  0.010 0.05 
Urban -0.990*** -3.48  -0.025 -0.14 
Agriculturea -0.368* -1.75  -0.440** -2.45 
Mining 0.542*** 2.94  0.356** 2.27 
Electricity 0.513*** 3.08  0.013 0.07 
Construction -0.350 -1.19  -0.279 -2.16 
Trade -0.298* -1.73  -0.147** -1.65 
Transport 0.171* 1.87  0.166 1.59 
Finances -0.053 -0.30  -0.055 -0.55 
Services 0.040 0.41  -0.060 -0.68 
Domestic -1.133*** -3.93  -0.349 -0.99 
Western Capeb 0.055 0.67  -0.140** -1.96 
Northern Cape -0.053 -0.36  -0.087 -0.57 
Eastern Cape -0.340 -1.53  -0.319*** -2.65 
Orange Free State -0.391*** -3.30  -0.308*** -3.35 
Natal -0.336*** -2.83  -0.023 -0.26 
North West -0.274 -1.57  -0.529** -2.53 
Mpumalanga 0.016 0.14  0.077 0.65 
Northern Province 0.021 0.11  -0.382 -1.34 
λp  2.185*** 3.61  0.595* 1.69 
λs  0.417*** 3.52  0.667*** 3.05 
Constant 5.720*** 4.89  3.225*** 4.74 
Observations 447  1027 
Adj R-squared 0.271  0.239 
F observed 230.7  12.07 
Notes:  
*** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level.  
a Reference category : Manufacturing. 
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where SCR0 : Sum of squares of residuals (whole sample) 
SCR1 : Sum of squares of residuals (unionised sub sample) 
SCR1 : Sum of squares of residuals (non-unionised sub sample) 
k : number of explanatory variables  
n1 : size of the unionised sub sample 
n2 : size of the unionised sub sample 
 
 
 Africans  Whites  

















SCR0 4372.4 4371.2  873.0 863.1 
SCR1 1548.6 1547.9  178.1 173.5 
SCR2 2774.1 2768.9  674.1 666.3 
k 32 33  32 33 
n1 3479 3479  447 447 
n2 4505 4505  1027 1027 
Fcomputed 2.85 3.02  1.07 1.19 
Fread 1 1  1 1 


















Earnings of individual i depends on the worker’s union status and are determined according to: 




ij β        (1) 
and 





n= + ( = , )    if  is in the nonunion sector          β        (2) 
Where, Wij is the logarithm of worker earnings and Xij is a vector of observable individual 
characteristics, determinants of the earnings. 
The union status is determined by the characteristics of individual workers, the selectivity of the 
union and employer’s recruitment policy and the relative wage in the union and the non-union 
sectors.  
Let yij be an unobservable variable which measures the net utility gain of union coverage for an 
individual i of race j. 
 
  =  +                 ( = , )1y Z  j w aij ij j ijα ε         (3) 
 
Where, Zij is a vector of exogeneous variables. 
The worker compares this net utility gain to the relative wage in the union sector. The wage ratio 
between union and non-union sectors is approximated by the difference in the logarithms of 
these wages W Wij
u
ij
n− (Lee (1978)). 
Then, the worker chooses to become a union member (USi = 1) only if the total benefit of 
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      (4) 
Under the assumption that the disturbance terms in equations (1), (2) and (3) are jointly normally 
distributed, equation (4) can be estimated by a probit model. 
Wage equations (1) and (2) are conditional on the union status choice and their estimation by 
ordinary least squares would produce inconsistent estimates of β since workers are not randomly 
assigned to the union and non-union sectors. Applying the Heckman’s two-step estimation 
procedure, we finally estimate the following wage equations : 



















 +  (5) 
and 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Chow (1960). 
M a k i n g  R a c i a l  W a g e  R e l a t i o n s  F a i r  i n  S A :  A  F o c u s  o n  t h e  R o l e  o f  T r a d e  U n i o n s  
 27
27 





















   (6) 
Where $ $λ γij j ijZ=  
 Φ and φ  are respectively the normal cumulative distribution and probability density 
functions. 




n−  and substitute this expression for W Wij
u
ij
n−  in equation (4). 
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The estimated probability that individual i of race j be unionised is : 
( )( )µ α αij j ij j iju ijnZ w w= + −Φ $ $ ln ln1 2            (8) 

























• Between two samples: 
The test for µ µx y= , when σ σx y
2 2≠ is given by t x y





The result is distributed Student’s t with ν  degrees of freedom, where ν  is given by: 
( )
( ) ( )
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• For one sample: 
The test for µ µx y= , when σ σx y
2 2= is given by t x y
n s n s
n n n n
x x y y










The result is distributed Student’s t with n-2 degrees of freedom.  
Source: STATA 6 reference manual 
 
 
• Average means of unionisation 
 
  Africans  Whites Test of significance b 
Observed Probability   0.435  0.303 21.13*** 
Predicted Probability  0.416  0.457 -6.35*** 
Test of significance  a  33.59***  -43.87***  
Observations  7984  1474  
Notes:  
a H0 : µ µa a
* − = 0  for Africans and µ µb b− =
* 0  for Whites.  
b H0 : µ µa b
* '− = 0  for observed probability and µ µb b− = 0  for predicted probabilities.  
*** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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• Average earnings. 
 
 
Observed and predicted earnings: 
 
  Unionised  Non-unionised 
Africans     
Observed earnings  2.101  1.447 
Predicted earnings  2.131  1.497 
Observations.  3479  4505 
Whites     
Observed earnings  3.064  3.097 
Predicted earnings  2.782  2.932 





Between African and White samples:  
 
HO  Unionised Non-unionised 
Observed earnings     
w woa ob− = 0   -49.22*** -95.70*** 
Predicted earnings     
w woa ob
* *− = 0   -34.11*** -73.38*** 
Note: *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Among African and White samples: 
 
HO  Unionised  Non-unionised 
African sample       
w woa oa
* − = 0
 
 24.84***  29.47*** 
White sample        
w wob ob− =
* 0
 
 19.12***  21.64*** 
Note: *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
